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Approaches to Alternative Teachers Compensation: Promises and Pitfalls January 2008 About 95% of public school districts use a uniform salary schedule. But merit pay and performance-based pay programs are attracting the attention of policymakers and educators across the nation(1). Critics of traditional compensation systems and newer alternatives point out the strengths of the system they support, but the limitations of individual systems are frequently misunderstood or unrecognized. To improve the viability of a new plan, WCER Fellow Debbi Harris suggests that policymakers and stakeholders conduct extensive analyses before implementation. In a recent Policy Brief(2) Harris examines ways that different compensation systems are likely to affect teacher behavior and student learning. Three kinds of teacher compensation systems are prevalent: the uniform salary schedule used in most districts, performance-based systems, and outcome-based systems. Systems similar to the uniform salary schedule are typical in unionized professions, where hours worked and years of service primarily influence compensation rates. Performance-based systems (also known as behavior-based systems) tie some portion of salary to observable teacher behavior, such as demonstration of a specific pedagogical technique. Outcome-based systems (also known as pay for performance) link compensation to student performance, such as test scores and attendance. The Uniform Salary Schedule But the uniform salary schedule provides no financial incentive for teachers to work hard. Salary depends on experience and education; performance is not a factor. High-quality teachers may feel unappreciated and unrewarded because they know that low performers in their district receive the same compensation. The uniform schedule does not necessarily attract the best candidates into teaching. Many bright and talented young students choose careers in business and other professions that pay a premium. The commonly rewarded characteristics—experience and attainment of advanced degrees—are not necessarily the characteristics of high-quality teachers. Merit Pay Systems While innovative compensation systems may offer advantages, they also require sustained political and financial support from policymakers. Unfortunately, policymakers have rarely demonstrated such commitment, and political support is frequently not sustained. And for merit pay to improve the quality of teaching, either poor teachers must leave the profession and be replaced by higher quality teachers, or existing teachers must improve. Well-designed merit pay systems are often complex. Since the parameters vary from plan to plan, even teachers who have worked under merit pay may have difficulty understanding a new program. And although compensation policy assumes that money strongly motivates employee performance, money may play a smaller role in motivating teacher behavior than in other professions. Performance (Behavior)-Based Systems However, it can be difficult to connect measurable behaviors to quality teaching. By one estimate, only about 3% of a teacher’s contribution to student achievement can be explained by skills that are easy to measure. The remaining 97% is attributable to qualities such as enthusiasm, which are not measurable, and for which good proxies are not available. No single teaching style or skill set is clearly superior: Some constructivist teachers do a marvelous job and so do some traditional teachers. One way out of this dilemma would be to reward performance based on some criteria other than specific classroom practices. Outcome-Based Systems Past outcome-based pay plans have often assessed teachers based on students’ absolute test scores, rather than on amount of improvement. A teacher whose students have gained 20 points, but remain below some cutoff, could be rated and rewarded more highly than a teacher whose students have gained only five points but scored over the threshold. And although students in low-income communities desperately need top-notch teachers, who tend to be effective for high-achieving and low-achieving students, outcome-based compensation systems have encouraged some of the best teachers to transfer to affluent schools where they are more likely to receive achievement bonuses. Some school districts have turned to value-added achievement measures, an increasingly popular strategy. Value-added measures attempt to isolate individual teachers’ contributions to student learning (for more, see WCER’s Value Added Research Center Web site). Individual and Group Reward Systems Group-based rewards recognize the collaborative nature of any schools’ effectiveness and reward teachers for their collective effort. Group-based systems are generally less costly to administer than their individual-based counterparts. However, it’s difficult to screen out effects of the district, prior schools, parents, and the community. Relative ranking systems, or tournament systems, offer rewards based on how one teacher compares to all the others in the system. Teachers are told what percentage of top performers will receive rewards prior to the beginning of the measurement period. Relative ranking allows the district to determine the amount of incentive pay to be rewarded. The district sets the cutoff in the rankings so that it matches available funds. The main problem with relative rankings is that they discourage cooperative behavior among coworkers. Implications and Recommendations
Many districts and states already assess their goals and needs regularly. This data can be used to identify strengths that can be exploited and limitations that can be addressed. For example, a state may have well designed standards, but a school may find that teachers rarely refer to these standards when designing the curriculum. Once policymakers identify and rank their goals, they can determine which, if any, are amenable to the influences of financial incentives directed at teachers. For example, some district goals can be advanced by teachers’ efforts, while others, such as those requiring capital improvements, are beyond a teacher’s reach. If policymakers approve a merit pay system, they must clearly identify goals and needs that teachers can appreciably influence, and then link them to specific rewards in the compensation system. When deciding which factors to reward financially, policymakers should consider the importance of the particular goal, the feasibility of motivating teachers to pursue it, and whether factors in the compensation system align with existing programs. Once a district or state has identified goals and considered the feasibility of using financial incentives to reach those goals, policymakers need to design a compensation system tailored to their context. If they are reasonably content with current conditions or have determined that targeted financial incentives are unlikely to produce substantive improvements, they may opt to continue using the uniform salary schedule. Or, they may move to a performance-based, outcome-based, or hybrid system. Harris says that, as policymakers consider the best way to meet their needs and ensure long-term political and financial support, the compensation system is likely to become increasingly complex. Complexity is desirable when it reduces the limitations of a particular system while effectively promoting specific goals, Harris says. But, as discussed earlier, complexity can also make the policy difficult to understand. The importance of educating teachers and other stakeholders about a proposed new system cannot be overestimated. (1)For example, Minnesota and Florida have statewide policies in place, with Florida’s policy (amended in April 2007) requiring every school in the state to distribute a portion of teacher compensation based on student test-score improvements. (2)Read the Policy Brief, “The Promises and Pitfalls of Alternative Teacher Compensation Approaches”
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